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Abstract
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent
receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post infor-
mation rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post
information. When the agent’s ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive,
whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post in-
formation is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from
adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information ag-
gravates truth-telling.
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1 Introduction
Economic theory recognizes that private information is a crucial determinant of economic
inefficiencies. In adverse selection models where a principal faces a privately informed agent
at the contracting stage, such as inmonopolistic price discrimination (e.g, Baron andMyerson,
1982) or public procurement (e.g. Laffont and Tirole, 1986), the agent’s private information
forces the seller to concede information rents to the agent. As a result, a trade–off between
rent extraction and efficiency emerges which leads to economic inefficiencies.
In contrast, Harris and Raviv (1978) show that, when the agent’s private information
arrives only ex post, after the agent’s decision to participate in the relationship, this trade-off
between rent extraction and efficiency does not emerge: the principal can extract the full
surplus from the relation without leaving rents to the agent.1 Esö and Szentes (2007a, b)
extend this result to a framework where the agent receives both ex ante and ex post private
information. In particular, they show that at the optimal mechanism, the agent’s additional
private ex post information does not add to the information rents that he receives already
from his ex ante information.2 These results suggest the general insight that only ex ante
private information is a source of information rents, whereas ex post private information is
not. The purpose of this paper is to qualify this insight and to offer a more comprehensive
perspective of the role of private ex post private information in dynamic adverse selection
problems.
Our main contribution is to show that in smooth continuous models such as Esö and
Szentes (2007a,b) ex post information rents are zero, whereas they are strictly positive in
models where the agent’s ex ante information is discrete. In order to demonstrate this re-
sult, we provide a formal decomposition of the agent’s total information rents into a part that
accrues from his ex ante information and a part that accrues from his ex post information.
Using this decomposition, we show that, in general, the seller has to concede the agent addi-
tional rents for eliciting his ex post private information, because the agent may benefit from
coordinating lies about his ex ante information with lies about his ex post information. We
show, however, that when the difference between ex ante types diminishes, the agent’s po-
tential benefits from coordinating his lies tend to zero at a faster speed than the difference
1This holds only in a framework with quasi–linear preferences where the agent is effectively risk neutral.
2Esö and Szentes (2007a) shows this for a single agent, whereas Esö and Szentes (2007b) demonstrates this
result for the case with many agents.
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between types. As a result, marginal ex post information rents vanish in the limit of a smooth
continuous model.
We further show that, as an implication of our result, full disclosure of ex post informa-
tion is no longer generally optimal when the agent’s ex ante private information is discrete,
whereas, as shown by Esö and Szentes (2007a, b), full disclosure is optimal in continuous
models. We identify two conflicting effects of disclosure. More disclosure is beneficial to the
seller because it allows him to choose among a larger set of allocations, as allocations can in-
directly depend on the agent’s message about the disclosed information. The negative effect
of more disclosure is however that, as already noted in Myerson (1991, p.297), "revealing
more information to players makes it harder to prevent them from finding ways to gain by
lying". The seller’s optimal disclosure rule trades off these two effects.
This paper contributes to the literature on dynamic mechanism design by focusing on the
role of dynamic private information.3 We built on Esö and Szentes’ (2007a, b) approach to
study the relevance of ex post information in models with both discrete and continuous ex
ante information. Next to demonstrating the relevance of ex post information in discrete
models, we provide an alternative proof for their result that ex post information is irrelevant
in continuous models.
Two recent papers are closely related to our partial disclosure result. First, also Li and Shi
(2013) present a partial disclosure result for the standard sequential screening model. The
key conceptual difference between our and their result is that Li and Shi (2013) consider more
general disclosure rules. In their framework the seller can disclose any information about the
final payoff type, which is a combination of both the buyer’s initial and additional private
information. In contrast, we allow partial disclosure only of the buyer’s additional informa-
tion. The results of Esö and Szentes (2007a) imply that with continuous type distributions,
partial disclosure of additional information is never strictly optimal. Hence, whereas we show
that this is no longer true with discrete types, Li and Shi (2013) show that partial disclosure
may be strictly optimal if it concerns the final payoff type rather than the buyer’s additional
information.
Second, Bergemann and Wambach (2013) provide an additional reason why partial dis-
3E.g., Baron and Besanko (1984), Courty and Li (2000), Battaglini (2005), Esö and Szentes (2007a, b), Hoff-
mann and Inderst (2011), Krähmer and Strausz (2011), Nocke et al. (2011), Pavan et al. (2012), Boleslavsky
and Said (2013), Deb and Said (2013).
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closure might be optimal. They show for the setting of Esö and Szentes (2007a) that by only
partially disclosing the additional information, the seller can relax participation constraints
without impairing revenue. Hence, if the buyer must not make losses, conditional on the
additional information disclosed, partial disclosure of additional information is optimal. In
contrast, in our setting partial disclosure may be optimal even though the buyer can make
losses ex post, after additional information has been disclosed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the formal model in the next
section. In Section 3, we set up the seller’s problem for the case where the agent’s ex post
information is private and public and discuss how these two problems relate to the question
of ex post information rents. In Section 4, we study the case of two ex ante types and demon-
strate that positive ex post information rents are necessary to prevent coordinated lying. In
Section 5, we study ex post information rents for the general case, distinguishing between
smooth continuous models, where the ex post information rent vanishes, and discrete mod-
els, where it does not. In Section 6 we explain with an explicit example that the seller is
strictly better off by disclosing ex post information only partially rather than fully. Section 7
concludes. All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
There is a seller (she) and a buyer (he). The seller’s costs to produce the good are commonly
known and normalized to zero. The buyer’s valuation is θ and takes values in [θ ,θ ]. The
terms of trade are the probability with which the good is sold, x ∈ [0,1], and a payment t ∈ R
from the buyer to the seller. Parties are risk–neutral and have quasi–linear utility functions.
That is, under the terms of trade x and t, the seller receives utility t, and the buyer receives
utility θ x − t. The seller’s objective is to design a selling mechanism that maximizes her
expected revenue where a selling mechanism specifies the terms of trade, possibly contingent
on communication between the parties.
When the seller offers a mechanism to the buyer, no party knows the true valuation, θ ,
but the buyer is better informed about the distribution from which θ is drawn than the seller.
Formally, it is common knowledge that θ is distributed according to the distribution function
F(·|s), where s is drawn from the support S ⊆ R with distribution function P. We follow the
literature and assume “non–shifting support”, that is, the support of F(·|s) is the interval [θ ,θ]
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for all s ∈ S. The distributions {F(θ |s)|s ∈ S} are ranked according to first order stochastic
dominance, that is, s > sˆ implies F(θ |s) < F(θ |sˆ) for all θ ∈ (θ ,θ). We further assume that
the density f (θ |s) = dF(θ |s)/dθ exists for each s ∈ S and is bounded away from zero, i.e.,
there exists some ǫ > 0 such that f (θ |s) > ǫ for all θ ∈ [θ ,θ] and s ∈ S. Hence, F(θ |s) is
strictly increasing in θ and decreasing in s.
Before the seller offers the buyer a mechanism, the buyer privately observes the signal
s so that we interpret s as the buyer’s ex ante private information. If the buyer accepts the
mechanism, then, before production takes place, θ is drawn according to F(·|s) and the buyer
observes this realization privately. In order to arrive at a proper definition of the agent’s ex
post private information embodied in the private observation of θ , we follow the idea of Esö
and Szentes (2007a, b) and write the buyer’s valuation as a compound of ex ante information
and additional, orthogonal ex post information. Define the random variable γ = F(θ |s).
Then γ is uniformly distributed on the unit interval and is stochastically independent of s.4
The buyer’s valuation can be backed out as a function of s and γ by
θ = θ (s,γ)≡ F−1(γ|s), (1)
where F−1 is the inverse of F with respect to θ and exists because F(θ |s) is strictly increasing
in θ . Hence, instead of assuming that s and θ is observed, we can equivalently assume that s
and γ is observed. Because γ is independent of s, the formulation in terms of s and γ allows
us to interpret γ as the agent’s ex post private information.
Thus we consider the following timing:
1. The buyer privately observes s.
2. The seller offers a mechanism.
3. The buyer accepts or rejects.
If he rejects, both parties receive their outside option normalized to zero.
4. If the buyer accepts, the buyer privately observes γ.
5. The terms of trade are implemented according to the mechanism.
We now introduce a distinction which will be key for our analysis:
Definition 1 (a)We say that themodel is continuous if S is an interval [s, s] and for all s ∈ (s, s):
∂ F(θ |s)
∂ s
exists and is bounded. (2)
4Note that for all s, it holds: Prob(γ < γ¯) = F(F−1(γ¯|s)|s) = γ¯.
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(b) We say that the model is discrete if S is a discrete set {s, . . . , s, . . . , s¯}.5
For the case that the model is continuous, our setting is identical to the setup in Esö and
Szentes (2007a, b)6 who show that the privacy of the ex post information γ is irrelevant in
the sense that the seller can fully extract the value of the buyer’s ex post information. The
main point of our paper is to qualify this result for the case that the model is discrete, and
to identify the source of the buyer’s ex post information rent. To make this point, we follow
Esö and Szentes (2007a, b) and compare the optimal selling mechanism when γ is observed
privately by the buyer to the optimal mechanism in the benchmark case when γ is publicly
observable.
In what follows, it will often be more convenient to work with the function θ (s,γ) rather
than with F(θ |s). Our assumptions on F(θ |s) translate directly into the following properties
of θ (s,γ).
Lemma 1 (a) For all s > sˆ:
θ (s,γ)> θ (sˆ,γ) ∀γ ∈ (0,1). (3)
(b) For all s, sˆ ∈ S and γ ∈ [0,1], there exists a unique γ∗ ∈ [0,1] such that
θ (sˆ,γ∗) = θ (s,γ).
(c) For all s ∈ S,γ ∈ (0,1):
∂ θ (s,γ)
∂ γ
exists, is strictly positive, and bounded. (4)
(d) If the model is continuous, then for all s ∈ S,γ ∈ (0,1):
∂ θ (s,γ)
∂ s
exists and is bounded. (5)
5Alternatively, we could equivalently define a discrete model as a model in which S is an interval and F(θ |s) is
piece-wise constant in s. Clearly, then F(θ |s)would not be differentiable for some s ∈ S and the model would not
be continuous in our sense. We believe that our formulation is more in line with standard practice in mechanism
design.
6Esö and Szentes (2007b) consider the auction case when the seller faces multiple potential buyers. Allowing
for multiple buyers would not change our results.
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3 The seller’s problem
In describing the seller’s problem, we begin with the case that the ex post information γ is
the buyer’s private information, and then describe the case when the ex post information is
publicly observable.
3.1 Privately observable ex post information
When both ex ante and ex post information are the buyer’s private information, we can apply
the revelation principle for dynamic games (Myerson, 1986) which states that the optimal
mechanism is in the class of direct and incentive compatible mechanisms. A direct and incen-
tive compatible mechanism specifies the terms of trade as functions of reports by the buyer
about his ex ante and ex post information and, moreover, induces the buyer, on the equilib-
rium path, to report his information truthfully.
Formally, a direct mechanism (x , t) is a combination of an allocation rule x and a transfer
schedule t with
x : S × [0,1]→ [0,1], t : S × [0,1]→ R
that requires the buyer to report a message sˆ ∈ S at the outset (before having observed γ)
and to subsequently (after having observed γ) report a message γˆ ∈ [0,1]. If a buyer who has
observed s and γ reports sˆ and γˆ, his utility from the mechanism is
u(sˆ, γˆ; s,γ) = θ (s,γ)x(sˆ, γˆ)− t(sˆ, γˆ).
With slight abuse of notation, we define the buyer’s utility from truth-telling as u(s,γ) =
u(s,γ; s,γ).
We say the mechanism (x , t) is ex post incentive compatible if it induces the buyer to report
his ex post information truthfully after having truthfully reported his ex ante information:
u(s,γ) ≥ u(s, γˆ; s,γ) ∀s,γ, γˆ. (6)
Note that the revelation principle requires truth-telling in the second stage only after truth-
telling in the first stage (see Myerson, 1986). Hence, it might (in fact, it will) be optimal for
the buyer, after he lied about s to lie also about γ. Thus, the buyer’s expected utility from
reporting sˆ at the initial stage when he has observed s is
U(sˆ; s) =
∫ 1
0
max
γˆ
u(sˆ, γˆ; s,γ) dγ. (7)
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The “max” operator under the integral accounts for the fact that the mechanism may induce
the buyer to lie about γ after lying about s. Again abusing notation, we define the buyer’s
utility from truth-telling at the initial stage as U(s) = U(s; s).
We say that the mechanism is ex ante incentive compatible if it induces the buyer to report
his ex ante information truthfully:
U(s) ≥ U(sˆ; s) ∀s, sˆ. (8)
A mechanism (x , t) is incentive compatible with privately observable γ if it is ex ante and ex
post incentive compatible.
We also assume that the seller wants to ensure the buyer’s participation in the mechanism,
and therefore the mechanism needs to give the buyer his outside option of zero. A mechanism
is individually rational if:
U(s) ≥ 0 ∀s. (9)
A mechanism is feasible with privately observable γ if it is incentive compatible with pri-
vately observable γ and individually rational. We say that the allocation rule x is imple-
mentable with privately observable γ if there are transfers t so that (x , t) is feasible with pri-
vately observable γ. We define by7
W (x) =max
t
∫
S
∫ 1
0
t(s,γ) dγ dP(s) s.t. (6), (8), (9) (10)
the principal’s maximal expected revenue from an implementable allocation rule x .
The seller’s problemwhen γ is private information, referred to asP , is to choose a feasible
mechanism that maximizes her expected revenue:
P : max
x ,t
∫
S
∫ 1
0
t(s,γ) dγ dP(s) s.t. (6), (8), (9). (11)
We refer to a solution to P as (x∗, t∗) and denote the seller’s value from problem P by W ∗.
3.2 Publicly observable ex post information
When the ex post information γ is publicly observable, the only private information of the
buyer is his initial information s. The revelation principle then implies that the optimal selling
7If S is discrete, the integral is to be understood as an integral over the discrete measure P and is thus a sum.
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mechanism is a direct and incentive compatible mechanism (x˜ , t˜) which requires the buyer
to report a message sˆ ∈ S about his ex ante information only, and which induces the buyer to
report truthfully. In addition to the buyer’s report, the mechanism can condition directly on
the ex post information γ, as γ is contractible by assumption.
Formally, if the buyer has observed s and reports sˆ at the outset, his expected utility from
the mechanism (x˜ , t˜) is
U˜(sˆ; s) =
∫ 1
0
{θ (s,γ)x˜(sˆ,γ)− t˜(sˆ,γ)} dγ. (12)
Note that, whatever the buyer’s report sˆ, the terms of trade are enforced according to the true
value of γ, as now γ does not need to be elicited from the buyer any more. We define, again
with slight abuse of notation, U˜(s) = U˜(s; s).
We say that a mechanism (x˜ , t˜) is incentive compatible with publicly observable γ if it induces
the buyer to report his initial information truthfully:
U˜(s) ≥ U˜(sˆ; s) ∀s, sˆ. (13)
As before, the seller wants to ensure the buyer’s participation in the mechanism, and there-
fore the mechanism needs to give the buyer his outside option of zero. We say a mechanism
is individually rational with publicly observable γ if:
U˜(s) ≥ 0 ∀s. (14)
A mechanism is feasible with publicly observable γ if it is incentive compatible and individu-
ally rational with publicly observable γ. We say that the allocation rule x˜ is implementable with
publicly observable γ if there are transfers t˜ so that (x˜ , t˜) is feasible with publicly observable
γ. We define by
W˜ (x˜) =max
t˜
∫
S
∫ 1
0
t˜(s,γ) dγ dP(s) s.t. (13), (14) (15)
the principal’s maximal expected revenue from an implementable allocation rule x˜ .
The seller’s problem when γ is public information, referred to as P˜ , is to choose a feasible
mechanism that maximizes her expected revenue:
P˜ : max
x˜ ,t
∫
S
∫ 1
0
t˜(s,γ) dγ dP(s) s.t. (13), (14). (16)
We refer to a solution to P˜ as (x˜∗, t˜∗) and denote the seller’s value from problem P˜ by W˜ ∗.
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3.3 Ex post information rents and revenue–irrelevance
A direct comparison of the cases with privately and publicly observable ex post information
allows us to study the role of the privacy of ex post information in the design of the optimal
mechanism. Clearly, a given allocation rule x that is implementable with privately observable
γ is implementable with publicly observable γ, and, moreover, the seller obtains a (weakly)
higher revenue from implementing x when γ is publicly observable. If the seller can attain
the same revenue when γ is private information, then the seller does not need to leave any
rent for eliciting the buyer’s ex post information when she wants to implement x .
Moreover, comparing the values W ∗ and W˜ ∗ reveals how the privacy of the ex post infor-
mation bears on the seller’s ability to extract surplus. If the seller attains the same revenue
when γ is private as when γ is public information, then private ex post information is irrel-
evant in the sense that it does not affect inefficiencies. These considerations motivate the
following definitions.
Definition 2 (a) Let x be implementable with privately observable γ. We say that x is imple-
mentable without ex post information rents if W (x) = W˜ (x).
(b) Private ex post information is said to be revenue-irrelevant if W ∗ = W˜ ∗.
Private ex post information may fail to be revenue–irrelevant for two reasons. First, the
allocation rule x˜∗ that is optimal when γ is publicly observable may simply not be imple-
mentable with privately observable γ. Second, even if x˜∗ is implementable, it may not be
implementable without ex post information rents.
Esö and Szentes (2007a, b) have shown that if the model is continuous and x˜∗ is imple-
mentable with privately observable γ, then private ex post information is revenue-irrelevant.
As as a consequence, x˜∗ is implementable without ex post information rents. In what follows,
we generalize the result of Esö and Szentes (2007a, b) and show that in continuous models,
any allocation rule that is implementable with privately observable γ is implementable with-
out ex post information rents. More interestingly, we also show that this result is not true
for discrete models. Indeed, in discrete models, an allocation rule that is implementable with
privately observable γ is implementable without ex post information rents only in degenerate
cases. This directly implies that in discrete models, ex post information is revenue–irrelevant
only in degenerate cases. In particular, even if the allocation rule x˜∗ is implementable with
privately observable γ, ex post information is typically not revenue-irrelevant.
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To illustrate the basic features of our general analysis, we now analyze a discrete model
with two types and show that private ex post information is not revenue-irrelevant.
4 Two ex ante types
Let S = {sL, sH} be the set of the buyer’s ex ante types, occurring with P(sL) = 1−p ∈ (0,1) and
P(sH) = p. To simplify notation, we replace the function arguments sL and sH by appending
function symbols with the subindices L and H. We assume that type sL corresponds to the low
valuation type and type sH to the high valuation type:
θL(γ) < θH(γ) ∀γ ∈ (0,1). (17)
4.1 Public ex post information
We begin by deriving the optimal selling mechanism when γ is public information. With two
ex ante types, a selling mechanism is a quadruple (x˜ , t˜) = (x˜ L(γ), t˜L(γ), x˜H(γ), t˜H(γ)), and
the incentive compatibility and participation constraints (13) and (14) write
ICH :
∫ 1
0
{θH(γ)x˜H(γ)− t˜H(γ)} dγ ≥
∫ 1
0
{θH(γ)x˜ L(γ)− t˜L(γ)} dγ;
ICL :
∫ 1
0
{θL(γ)x˜ L(γ)− t˜L(γ)} dγ ≥
∫ 1
0
{θL(γ)x˜H(γ)− t˜H(γ)} dγ;
IRH :
∫ 1
0
{θH(γ)x˜H(γ)− t˜H(γ)} dγ ≥ 0;
IRL :
∫ 1
0
{θL(γ)x˜ L(γ)− t˜L(γ)} dγ ≥ 0.
Standard arguments can be employed to show that at the optimal selling mechanism the
incentive constraint for the high valuation type and the participation constraint for the low
valuation type are binding and that the allocation rule has to satisfy a monotonicity property
with respect to the ex ante information.8
Lemma 2 With two ex ante types, the mechanism (x˜ , t˜)which is optimal with publicly observable
γ maximizes the seller’s objective subject to (ICH) and (IRL) being binding, and
∫ 1
0
[θH(γ) −
θL(γ)][x˜H(γ)− x˜ L(γ)] dγ ≥ 0.
8The condition
∫ 1
0
[θH(γ)− θL(γ)][ x˜H(γ)− x˜L(γ)] dγ ≥ 0 is a monotonicity condition because, as θH(γ)−
θL(γ)> 0 for all γ ∈ (0,1), the condition is satisfied if x˜H(γ)≥ x˜L(γ) “on average”.
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The binding constraints pin down the (expected) transfers as a function of the allocation
rule according to∫ 1
0
t˜L(γ) dγ =
∫ 1
0
θL(γ)x˜ L(γ) dγ; (18)∫ 1
0
t˜H(γ) dγ =
∫ 1
0
θH(γ)x˜H(γ) dγ+
∫ 1
0
[θL(γ)− θH(γ)]x˜ L(γ) dγ. (19)
Substituting out the transfer schedules in the seller’s objective, the seller’s problem simplifies
to
max
x˜ , t˜
∫ 1
0
{pθH(γ)x˜H(γ) + [θL(γ)− pθH(γ)]x˜ L(γ)} dγ
s.t.
∫ 1
0
[θH(γ)− θL(γ)][x˜H(γ)− x˜ L(γ)] dγ ≥ 0. (20)
To solve this problem, we can adopt the standard approach and first ignore the monotonicity
constraint (20). We then obtain the solution to this relaxed problem by point-wise maximiza-
tion. It is then easy to verify that the solution to the relaxed problem always satisfies the
monotonicity constraint so that it is also a solution to the original problem. We summarize
this in the next lemma.
Lemma 3 With two types, the solution (x˜∗, t˜∗) to problem P˜ is given by
x˜∗
H
(γ) = 1 ∀γ ∈ [0,1], x˜∗
L
(γ) =
(
0 i f θL(γ)< pθH(γ)
1 else.
(21)
The optimal transfers t˜∗
H
and t˜∗
L
are only pinned down in expectation by (18) and (19).
Thus, under the optimal mechanism with publicly observable γ, the high valuation type sH
always consumes the good (“no distortion at the top”), and the low valuation type sL consumes
the good only if θL(γ) ≥ pθH(γ). The high valuation type sH obtains an information rent of
U˜H =
∫ 1
0
[θH(γ)− θL(γ)]x˜
∗
L
(γ) dγ =
∫
γ:θL(γ)≥pθH (γ)
{θH(γ)− θL(γ)} dγ. (22)
4.2 Private ex post information
We now show that when γ is the buyer’s ex post private information, the seller is strictly worse
off than when γ is publicly observable. We derive this result by showing that, with private ex
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post information, the seller has to concede to the buyer strictly more information rents if she
wants to implement the same allocation rule x˜∗ that is optimal when γ is publicly observable.
That is, x˜∗ is not implementable without ex post information rents.
To prove our claim, we can use the following result from the literature: a deterministic
allocation rule9 is implementable with privately observable γ if, and only if, two properties
hold: first, for each ex ante type, the allocation rule is non–decreasing in the ex post infor-
mation; second, if the allocation rule prescribes consumption at a certain valuation for some
ex ante type, then consumption is prescribed at all higher valuations for all larger ex ante
types.10,11 We now apply this result to the allocation rule x˜∗ in (21). Note that the second
requirement is trivially met since x˜∗
H
(γ) = 1 for all γ. The first requirement is met for type
s = sH since x˜
∗
H
(γ) is clearly non–decreasing in the ex post information γ. Thus, all that is
needed to implement x˜∗ is that x˜∗
L
is non–decreasing in γ:
Lemma 4 The allocation rule x˜∗ in (21) is implementable with privately observable γ if, and
only if, x˜∗
L
(γ) is non–decreasing in γ.
Hence, if x˜∗
L
is not non–decreasing, private ex post information is revenue–relevant for
the simple reason that the optimal allocation rule x˜∗ is not implementable with privately
observable γ. More interestingly, we now show that even if x˜∗ is implementable with privately
observable γ, private ex post information is not revenue-irrelevant. Therefore, we focus from
now on on the case that x˜∗
L
is monotone in the ex post information γ. A sufficient condition
for this is that the ratio θL(γ)/θH(γ) is strictly increasing because this guarantees a unique
solution γL to the equation θL(γL) = pθH(γL), and (21) then prescribes the good to be sold
to the low valuation buyer type whenever γ≥ γL.
12 We now show that to implement x˜∗ with
privately observable γ the seller has to concede a higher information rent to the buyer than
in the case with publicly observable γ.
Indeed, ex post incentive compatibility requires that the buyer type sL, after having re-
ported his ex ante information truthfully, reports γ truthfully in the second stage. This implies
that the transfers tL are piece-wise constant, and that at the critical realization γL, the buyer
9An allocation rule x is deterministic if x(s,γ) ∈ {0,1} for all s and γ.
10Formally: for s < sˆ, if x(s,γ) = 1, then x(sˆ, γˆ) = 1 for all γˆ with θ (sˆ, γˆ)≥ θ (s,γ).
11The “if” part holds more generally also for non–deterministic allocation rules and was first proven in Courty
and Li (2000). For a proof of the “only if” part, see Krähmer and Strausz (2011, Lemma 6).
12An example for which θL(γ)/θH(γ) is strictly increasing, is: θH(γ) = γ, and θL(γ) = γ
2.
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type sL is indifferent between consuming and not consuming the good:
tL(γ) =
(
t0
L
i f γ < γL
t1
L
else
, and − t0
L
= θL(γL)− t
1
L
. (23)
To see that ex post incentive compatibility implies these restrictions on the transfer schedule,
note that if tL were not constant on [0,γL), then since the allocation rule is constant on [0,γL),
there would be some realizations in [0,γL) for which the buyer would benefit from reporting
the value of γ that maximizes tL on [0,γL) instead of reporting his true value. For the same
reason, tL needs to be constant on [γL, 1]. On a related note, if the buyer were not indifferent
between consuming and not consuming the good at the value γL, but, say, strictly preferred
consumption, then he would still strictly prefer consumption at a value γ slightly smaller than
γL and would thus benefit from pretending to have observed γL in this case.
Condition (23) pins down only the difference t1
L
− t0
L
= θL(γL), but not the absolute mag-
nitude of the transfers. As is usual, we may interpret rL ≡ t
1
L
− t0
L
as an exercise price at
which the buyer is allowed to buy the product after learning γ. Likewise, t0
L
corresponds to
an upfront payment by the buyer that gives him the option to make his consumption decision
after he has fully learned his valuation. Note that by adjusting the upfront payment t0
L
, while
keeping the exercise price fixed, the seller determines the buyer’s utility without affecting
the allocation. The expected utility of the buyer type sL if he reports his ex ante information
truthfully is
UL = −t
0
L
+
∫ 1
γL
{θL(γ)− rL} dγ. (24)
Now observe that x˜∗
L
and the payments tL fully determine the high valuation buyer’s ex-
pected utility ULH when he pretends to be type sL. Since ex ante incentive compatibility
requires that the high valuation buyer attains at least a rent of ULH , we can now obtain a
lower bound on the rent that the seller has to concede to the buyer. To compute ULH , note
that after having reported sL, the buyer type sH exercises the option whenever
θH(γ) > rL ⇔ γ > θ
−1
H
(rL). (25)
The key observation is that when the high valuation type sH reports sL, he exercises the option
more frequently than when the low valuation type sL reports sL. This is simply so because for
any realization γ of ex post information, he displays a higher valuation than the buyer type
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sL. Hence, for any value of γ so that θH(γ) > rL > θL(γ) the buyer type sH does, and the buyer
type sL does not exercise the option. Therefore,
ULH = −t
0
L
+
∫ 1
θ−1
H
(rL)
{θH(γ)− rL} dγ (26)
= −t0
L
+
∫ γL
θ−1H (rL)
{θH(γ)− rL} dγ+
∫ 1
γL
{θH(γ)− rL} dγ (27)
= UL +
∫ γL
θ−1H (rL)
{θH(γ)− rL} dγ+
∫ 1
γL
{θH(γ)− θL(γ)} dγ, (28)
where we have used (24) in the last line.
To obtain a lower bound on the rent the seller has to concede to the high valuation buyer,
note that ex ante incentive compatibility requires UH ≥ ULH and individual rationality requires
UL ≥ 0. As a result, by (28), the high valuation type sH obtains a rent of at least
13
UH ≥
∫ γL
θ−1H (rL)
{θH(γ)− rL} dγ+
∫ 1
γL
{θH(γ)− θL(γ)} dγ. (29)
Now, reconsider the high valuation type’s rent when γ is publicly observable. For the case that
x˜ L is monotone, we obtain from (22):
U˜H =
∫ 1
γL
{θH(γ)− θL(γ)} dγ. (30)
Comparing expression (29) to expression (30) makes clear that the buyer obtains an addi-
tional information rent from the privacy of the ex post information of
∆UH = UH − U˜H ≥
∫ γL
θ−1H (rL)
{θH(γ)− rL} dγ.
The expression also identifies the source of this additional rent. When ex post information is
public, the contract enforces consumption directly, and irrespective of his true valuation, the
buyer consumes only for γ ≥ γL. In contrast when ex post information is private, the buyer
effectively makes the consumption decision himself. As a result of his higher valuation, the
high valuation buyer consumes the good more frequently than the low valuation buyer, and
this is an additional source of rents: relative to the low valuation buyer, the high valuation
buyer obtains not only the rent θH(γ)− θL(γ) whenever both buyer types decide to consume
13It may be shown that this lower bound is actually attainable.
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but he also gets the rent θH(γ)− rL when the high valuation buyer does and the low valuation
buyer does not decide to consume ex post.
More generally, the transfers t˜∗ that prevent the buyer from lying when ex post information
is public are not sufficient to prevent the buyer from lying when ex post information is private.
This is so because when ex post information is private, a lie about his ex ante information is
more valuable to the buyer since he can coordinate it with a lie about his ex post information.
Put differently, while x˜∗ is implementable with private ex post public information “on the
path”, it is not implementable with private ex post information “off the path” after a lie by the
high valuation buyer. Even though a lie by the buyer is a zero probability event, the fact that
the buyer can use his private ex post information to obtain a strictly higher utility off the path
relative to when ex post information is public implies that the seller has to pay a higher rent
to prevent the buyer from lying than with public ex post information.
To see that the strictly higher rents imply that private ex post information is not revenue–
irrelevant, observe that x˜∗ is the unique optimal allocation rule when γ is publicly observable.
Therefore, implementing any different allocation rule x∗ 6= x˜∗ yields a smaller payoff than W˜ ∗
already when γ is observable. Because, as shown, x˜∗ requires the seller to pay larger rents
to the buyer, the seller’s revenue when γ is private is smaller than W˜ ∗ so that private ex post
information is revenue–relevant.
5 The general case
In this section, we generalize the findings for the two types case. We first provide a decom-
position of the buyer’s rent into ex ante and ex post information rent. This is the crucial step
to study the role of ex post information.
5.1 Ex ante and ex post information rents
We begin with two auxiliary lemmas. The first lemma states the well–known characterization
of ex post incentive compatibility (we omit the proof).
Lemma 5 The mechanism (x , t) is ex post incentive compatible if, and only if, u(s,γ) is differen-
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tiable in γ for almost every γ ∈ [0,1], and it holds for all s ∈ S:
∂ u(s,γ)
∂ γ
=
∂ θ (s,γ)
∂ γ
x(s,γ) a.e., (31)
x(s,γ) is non–decreasing in γ. (32)
We next characterize the buyer’s ex post reporting strategy. We define by
Γ
∗(s, sˆ,γ) = argmax
γˆ
u(sˆ, γˆ; s,γ) (33)
all optimal second stage reports by a buyer who has observed s and γ and who has reported sˆ
at the outset. The next lemma describes how the buyer optimally coordinates a lie about his
ex ante information with a lie about his ex post information. It says that a buyer type who
has observed s and γ and who has reported sˆ submits a “corrected” report γ∗ so that he has
the same valuation and ends up with the same utility as a buyer type who has observed sˆ and
γ∗ and who has reported truthfully.
Lemma 6 If a mechanism is ex post incentive compatible, then there is a γ∗ = γ∗(s, sˆ,γ) ∈
Γ
∗(s, sˆ,γ) so that:
(a) θ (s,γ) = θ (sˆ,γ∗);
(b) u(sˆ,γ∗; s,γ) = u(sˆ,γ∗) =maxγˆ u(sˆ, γˆ; s,γ).
In light of the lemma, we can, without loss of generality, assume that a buyer who has
observed s and γ and who has reported sˆ at the outset, reports γ∗ = γ∗(s, sˆ,γ) in the second
stage.
We can now provide a decomposition of the buyer’s information rent in ex ante and ex
post rent. For an arbitrary allocation rule x , let
Rxa(s, sˆ, x) ≡
∫ 1
0
[θ (s,γ)− θ (sˆ,γ)]x(sˆ,γ) dγ; (34)
Rxp(s, sˆ, x) ≡
∫ 1
0
∫ γ∗(s,sˆ,γ)
γ
∂ θ (sˆ, c)
∂ γ
[x(sˆ, c)− x(sˆ,γ)] dc dγ. (35)
Lemma 7 (a) A mechanism (x˜ , t˜) is incentive compatible with publicly observable γ if, and only
if, for all s, sˆ:
U˜(s)− U˜(sˆ) ≥ Rxa(s, sˆ, x˜). (36)
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Figure 1: Ex ante vs. ex post information rents.
(b) A mechanism (x , t) is incentive compatible with privately observable γ if, and only if, (31)
and (32) are satisfied and for all s, sˆ, it holds:
U(s)− U(sˆ) ≥ Rxa(s, sˆ, x) + Rxp(s, sˆ, x). (37)
Moreover, Rxp(s, sˆ, x)≥ 0, where the inequality is strict if x(sˆ,γ) is not constant in γ on (0,1).
Lemma 7 provides, for both the case that ex post information is publicly and privately
observable, lower bounds for the information rents a buyer of type s has to obtain so as not
to pretend to be of type sˆ. When ex post information is private, the lower bound can be
decomposed into a part Rxa and a part Rxp. The part Rxa is the same as the lower bound
when ex post information is public and, therefore, accrues from the buyer’s ex ante private
information. Consequently, the part Rxp is the buyer’s rent that accrues from his ex post private
information.
Figure 1 illustrates the decomposition graphically for the two types case and the allocation
rule x˜∗ given by (21) when x˜∗
L
is monotone. When γ is publicly observable, the high valuation
buyer type sH can, by announcing type sˆ = sL, secure himself the same utility as the low
valuation buyer plus the utility increment θH(γ)−θL(γ) he receives due to his higher valuation
whenever consumption is enforced by the mechanism with positive probability. To prevent
type sH frommisreporting type sˆ = sL, the seller needs to pay him at least a rent corresponding
to the expected utility increment, as expressed by Rxa. Because the allocation rule x˜∗ in
the two type case prescribes consumption exactly when γ exceeds the cutoff γL, the ex ante
information rent Rxa corresponds to the area in between the curves θH(γ) and θL(γ) over the
range γL to 1 as depicted in the figure.
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When γ is privately observable, the high valuation buyer can increase his utility from a
misreport sˆ = sL by combining it with a misreport γˆ about his ex post information that induces
his most preferred allocation x(sˆ, γˆ) that is available ex post. This additional source of rent is
captured by the term Rxp. The ex post information rent is strictly positive if, conditional on
the first report sˆ, the allocation is responsive to the second report γˆ. Only in this case, there
are realizations of γ so that the high valuation buyer can use the private ex post information
to induce a better allocation for himself than the allocation that is enforced when γ is public.
Note that the allocation rule x˜∗ with two ex ante types sH and sL is responsive, as it prescribes
consumption only if γ exceeds γL. As illustrated in Figure 1 this leads to a strictly positive
ex post information rent Rxp. It corresponds to the area between θH(γ) and θL(γL) over the
range from γ∗ to γL, because exactly for these realization of γ a high valuation type would
obtain a utility increase of θH(γ)− θL(γL) by reporting γ > γL in comparison to reporting γ
truthfully and ending up with no consumption.
We now use the decomposition to study the relevance of ex post information. We show
that ex post information does not give rise to additional rents and is revenue–irrelevant in
continuous models, but for discrete models this is true only in the degenerate case that the
allocation is not responsive to the second report γˆ for the lowest type s.
5.2 Continuous model
We first show that for continuous models, the information rents are the same with public and
private ex post information, because the marginal ex post information rent, Rxp disappears.
Lemma 8 Suppose the model is continuous, then for an arbitrary allocation rule x, it holds:
(a)
lim
δ→0
Rxp(s+δ, s, x)
δ
= 0. (38)
(b) Moreover, if x is implementable with privately observable γ, then U˜ and U are differentiable
for almost all s ∈ S, and whenever the derivatives exist, it holds:
U˜ ′(s) = U ′(s) ≥ 0. (39)
The reason for why themarginal ex post information rent disappears can be intuitively seen
as follows. The ex post information rent of a high valuation buyer relative to a low valuation
19
γθ
1
1
θH(γ)
θL(γ)
γL
θL(γL)
θM(γL)
γ∗(sH , sL,γL)
γ∗(sM , sL,γL)
θM(γ)
Rxp
Rxa
Figure 2: Quadratic reduction of Rxp vs. linear reduction of Rxa.
buyer is essentially the product of two factors: the valuation increment and the probability
with which the high valuation buyer benefits from misrepresenting his ex post information
when he pretended to be the low valuation buyer. As the distance between the two ex ante
types diminishes, both of these factors go to zero, because the valuation difference diminishes,
and, crucially, because the set of realizations γ for which a misreport is still beneficial becomes
smaller and smaller. Therefore, as the distance between ex ante types goes to zero, the ex
post rent converges to zero at a quadratic speed.
In contrast, the ex ante rent converges to zero only at a linear speed, because only the
difference in valuations diminishes, but the probability with which consumption is enforced
by the mechanism does not diminish as the distance between ex ante types diminishes.
Figure 2 illustrates this graphically. As a result of introducing an additional intermediate ex
ante type sM , the area R
xp shrinks both in the vertical dimension, because the difference in the
valuations between type sL and the next higher type sM becomes smaller, and in the horizontal
dimension, because when having announced to be type sˆ = sL, type sM manipulates the ex
post private information for a smaller range of ex post information than type sH . In contrast,
the area Rxa shrinks only in the vertical dimension, because the probability with which the
contract enforces consumption upon an announcment of type sˆ = sL does not change by the
introduction of the intermediate type sM .
To complete the argument for why ex post information rents are zero in continuous mod-
els, notice that since U˜ ′(s) = U ′(s) ≥ 0, both with publicly and privately observable ex post
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information, the individual rationality constraints (9) and (14) are met if and only if they are
met for the lowest valuation type s. Therefore, both with publicly and privately observable ex
post information, the revenue maximizing way for the seller to implement an allocation rule
is to have the individual rationality constraint for the lowest type binding: U˜(s) = U(s) = 0.
Because U˜ ′(s) = U ′(s), the buyer’s utility is consequently the same with privately and with
publicly observable ex post information, establishing our first main result:
Proposition 1 Suppose the model is continuous. Then it holds:
(a) Any allocation rule x that is implementable with privately observable γ, is implementable
without ex post information rents.
(b) (Esö and Szentes (2007a, b)) If x˜∗ is implementable with privately observable γ, ex post
information is revenue–irrelevant.
Part (a) of the proposition says that when the model is continuous, the agent never gets
any information rents from his ex post information. This extends Esö and Szentes (2007a,
b) who show this result only with respect to the allocation rule that is optimal when ex post
information is public, as stated in part (b). In particular, if revenue–irrelevance fails in the
continuous model, then it fails for implementability reasons, not because the principal has to
concede more rents with private than with public ex post information.
5.3 Discrete model
We now turn to the discrete model and show that, only in rather special cases, ex post infor-
mation does not increase the agent’s rent. Recall that (x∗, t∗) is an the optimal mechanism
with privately observable γ.
Proposition 2 Suppose the model is discrete. Then it holds:
(a) Any allocation rule x that is implementable with privately observable γ, is implementable
without information rents only if x(s,γ) is constant in γ on (0,1).
(b) Ex post information is revenue–irrelevant only if x∗(s,γ) is constant in γ on (0,1).
To understand the result, note that if x(s,γ) is not constant in γ, then Lemma 7b implies
that the implementation of x with privately observable γ requires that all types larger than s
are paid a strictly positive ex post rent Rxp in order to prevent them from claiming to be type
s. By Lemma 7a, when γ is publicly observable, the seller can dispense with these extra rents
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when implementing x and only pay the ex ante rents Rxa to the buyer. This applies to any x
that is implementable with privately observable γ and, in particular, for x∗. Hence, the seller
can implement the optimal allocation x∗ with strictly smaller information rents when γ is
publicly observable. This means that ex post information is not revenue-irrelevant in discrete
models.
For sequential screening models with discrete ex ante types where the so called first order
approach works, it is generally known that the optimal sequential mechanism, for any ex ante
type s, prescribes consumption and hence does not display a distortion for the most efficient
ex post type γ = 1 (see, e.g., Courty and Li, 2000 or Battaglini, 2005).14 In this case, we can
strengthen Proposition 2b by stating that ex post information is revenue–irrelevant only if the
optimal mechanism implements the efficient outcome where the buyer always consumes the
good so that there are no distortions.
6 Disclosure of ex post information
In this section, we show that our findings have relevant implications for the seller’s incentives
to disclose ex post information to the buyer. As observed already by Esö and Szentes (2007a,
b), when ex post private information is revenue–irrelevant, the seller optimally discloses any
additional information to the buyer ex post even if the buyer observes such information pri-
vately. This is because the seller can extract the full value of information as if ex post infor-
mation was publicly observable. We now show that full disclosure is, in fact, not optimal in
general. We provide an example of a discrete model in which there exists a partial disclosure
policy that allows the seller to attain the same revenue W˜ ∗ as when ex post information is
public.
We reconsider the model with two types from Section 4 and assume that the buyer can
only observe the ex ante information s, but that the extent of the ex post information the
buyer observes is controlled by the seller. More specifically, as in Esö and Szentes (2007a, b),
we assume that the seller can disclose to the buyer, without observing herself, the realization
of any signal that is correlated with the underlying ex post information γ. In particular, the
seller may adopt a “binary” disclosure rule which reveals to the buyer only whether γ is below
14There are good reasons to conjecture that this is a general property of optimal sequential mechanisms in
any context, but proving this conjecture would go beyond the scope of this paper.
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or above some cutoff value γ0. We now consider a specific example in which there is such a
partial disclosure rule which allows the seller to attain the revenue W˜ ∗. Let
θL(γ) = γ
2, θH(γ) = γ. (40)
By Lemma 3, the optimal mechanism with publicly observable γ for specification (40) is
given by the monotone allocation rule
x˜∗
H
(γ) = 1 ∀γ ∈ [0,1], x˜∗
L
(γ) =
(
0 i f γ < p
1 else,
(41)
and expected payments (by (18) and (19))
t¯L =
∫ 1
p
θL(γ) dγ; t¯H =
∫ 1
0
θH(γ) dγ+
∫ 1
p
[θL(γ)− θH(γ)] dγ. (42)
Now suppose that the seller commits to a partial disclosure mechanism that reveals to the
buyer ex post only whether γ is below or above the cutoff value γ0 = p. In addition, she offers
the buyer the following menu of option contracts:
• By announcing type sH , the buyer pays the price t¯H and receives the good for sure.
• By announcing the type sL, the buyer receives the right to buy the good at a price rL =
t¯L/(1− γ0) after having learned the additional information.
We claim that this partial disclosure mechanism implements the allocation rule x˜∗ and
yields the seller the revenue W˜ ∗. Therefore, under the partial disclosure rule, the ex post
private information is revenue-irrelevant, which, as we have seen in Section 4, is not the case
under full disclosure.
More precisely, we show that, under the partial disclosure role, the high valuation buyer
does no longer benefit from a lie ex post after having lied initially. In other words, the menu of
option contracts does not only implement the allocation rule x˜∗ “on the path”, after the buyer
has announced his type s truthfully, but also “off the path”, after a lie by the buyer. Note that
if this is true, then, on the path, the high valuation buyer consumes the good with probability
1, inducing the payment t¯H for sure, and the low valuation buyer consumes the good with
probability P[γ > γ0] = 1 − γ0, inducing expected payments t¯L. Therefore, not only the
allocation rule, but also the expected payments under the partial disclosuremechanism are the
same as under the optimal mechanism with publicly observable γ. This directly implies that
the partial disclosure mechanism is ex ante incentive compatible and individually rationally
and yields the seller the same revenue as the optimal mechanism with publicly observable γ.
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To see that the partial disclosure mechanism implements x˜∗ on and off the path, observe
first that after an announcement sH , the good is consumed with probability 1 no matter which
buyer type made the announcement. Next consider what happens after an announcement sL,
and take first the case that the low valuation buyer has made this announcement. Observe
that the exercise price rL exactly matches the expected valuation of the low valuation buyer
when he learns that γ exceeds γ0:
E[θL(γ)|γ > γ0] =
∫ 1
γ0
θL(γ)
1− γ0
dγ =
t¯L
1− γ0
= rL. (43)
It is therefore optimal for the low valuation buyer sL to exercise the option if, only if, he learns
that γ exceeds γ0.
Next, consider the case that the high valuation buyer announced sL. Since θH(γ) > θL(γ)
for γ ∈ (0,1), it follows E[θH(γ)|γ > γ0] > E[θL(γ)|γ > γ0] = rL, and thus the high valuation
buyer exercises the option when he learns that γ > γ0. On the other hand, when he learns
that γ < γ0, then using (40), his expected payoff is
E[θH(γ)|γ < γ0]− t¯L/(1− γ0) = γ0/2− (1− γ
3
0
)/(3− 3γ0) = −(2γ
2
0
− γ0 + 2)/6 < 0. (44)
The inequality follows because the expression attains a maximum of −5/16 at γ0 = 1/4.
This shows that the partial disclosure mechanism implements x˜∗ on and off the path,
and, as a result, the seller obtains the expected revenue W˜ ∗. As shown in Section 4, this is
more than what the seller can obtain under full disclosure, and therefore partial disclosure is
optimal.
Intuitively, partial disclosure eliminates the ex post information rent, because it affects the
way how the buyer uses his ex post information. Even though the high valuation buyer, after
having announced sL, is still free to misrepresent his ex post information, the disclosure policy
is designed so that it is no longer optimal for the buyer to do so, but rather to choose the same
allocation that would be enforced when the ex post information were public. In this case, ex
post information does not yield additional rents.
That there is a disclosure rule that implements the same outcome as if ex post information
was public, is a special feature of our example. On a more general note, restricting the ex
post information available to the buyer has two countervailing effects. On the one hand, it
reduces ex post information rents, as it diminishes the value from misrepresenting ex post
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information off the path. On the other hand, it also reduces the set of allocations that can be
implemented on the path. We conjecture that, unlike in our example, there is in general no
disclosure rule that fully resolves this trade–off and permits the seller to attain W˜ ∗.
The effect that revealing less information reduces information rents and may therefore be
beneficial to the seller, is reminiscent of a general insight in mechanism design that "revealing
more information to players makes it harder to prevent them from finding ways to gain by
lying" (Myerson 1991, p.297) so that one should reveal "to each player only the minimum
information needed to guide his action" (Myerson 1991, p.260). Indeed in our example, re-
vealing only whether γ is larger or smaller than γ0 = p is the minimum amount of information
revelation that is needed to implement the allocation rule. Disclosing more information only
makes it more difficult to satisfy incentive compatibility, leading to higher implementation
costs in the form of positive ex post information rents.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we show that, in general, a principal has to pay information rents for inducing
an agent to reveal his private ex post information in excess of the rents that she needs to
pay for eliciting the agent’s private ex ante information. We interpret these additional rents
as ex post information rents. The principal has to pay such rents, because in their absence
the agent would benefit from coordinating his ex ante and ex post lies. The agent’s potential
benefits from such coordinated lying are strictly positive when the ex ante private information
is discrete and the ex post private information is continuous. In such a model, the classical
trade-off between rents and efficiency is more subtle, because the rents consist of both ex
ante and ex post information rents. An interesting question for future research is to investigate
how the potential problem of coordinated lying manifests itself in dynamic mechanism design
models with more than two periods.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: (a) The claim follows directly from the assumption that F(θ |s) first order
stochastically dominates F(θ |s) for s > sˆ.
(b) The claim follows from the non–shifting support assumption, and because F(θ |s) is
strictly increasing and continuous in θ for all s ∈ S.
(c) Existence of ∂ θ (s,γ)/∂ γ follows because F has a density f . In particular, ∂ θ (s,γ)/∂ γ=
1/ f (θ (s,γ)|s) is strictly positive and bounded because f (θ , s) is strictly positive and bounded
away from zero.
(d) Finally, if the model is continuous, then ∂ F(θ |s)/∂ s exists and, because in addition
f (θ |s) > 0, we can apply the implicit function theorem to obtain ∂ θ (s,γ)/∂ s by differentiat-
ing the identity F(θ (s,γ)|s) = γ with respect to s:
∂ F(θ |s)
∂ θ
∂ θ (s,γ)
∂ s
+
∂ F(θ |s)
∂ s
= 0 ⇔
∂ θ (s,γ)
∂ s
= −
∂ F(θ |s)
∂ s
1
f (θ |s)
. (45)
Boundedness of ∂ θ (s,γ)/∂ s follows because ∂ F(θ |s)/∂ s is bounded and f (θ |s) is bounded
away from zero. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Adding up (ICH) and (ICL) and re–arranging yields:∫ 1
0
[θH(γ)− θL(γ)][x˜H(γ)− x˜ L(γ)] dγ ≥ 0. (46)
Moreover, (ICH) and (IRL) imply (IRH) because of (17). Therefore, (IRH) can be ignored,
and it follows that at the optimum, (IRL) and (ICH) are binding, because otherwise, without
affecting any other constraint, the expected transfers to type sL could be reduced until (IRL)
binds, and the expected transfers to type sH could be reduced until (ICH) binds. Since (ICH)
is binding, (46) implies∫ 1
0
t˜L(γ)− t˜H(γ) dγ =
∫ 1
0
θH(γ)[x˜ L(γ)− x˜H(γ)] dγ ≤
∫ 1
0
θL(γ)[x˜ L(γ)− x˜H(γ)],
but this inequality is the same as (ICL). Hence, also (ICL) can be ignored, and the claim
follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3 Follows directly from the main text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4 Follows directly from the main text. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 5 Standard and therefore omitted. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6 By Lemma 1b, there is a unique γ∗ so that θ (s,γ∗) = θ (sˆ,γ∗). If type s has
reported type sˆ and observed γ, he chooses γˆ to maximize
θ (s,γ)x(sˆ, γˆ)− t(sˆ, γˆ) = θ (sˆ,γ∗)x(sˆ, γˆ)− t(sˆ, γˆ). (47)
By ex post incentive compatibility for type sˆ, the report γˆ= γ∗ maximizes the right hand side
of (47). Thus, γ∗ is an optimal report in the second stage when type s has reported type sˆ and
observed γ.
To see (b), note that because of (a), we have
u(sˆ,γ∗; s,γ) = θ (s,γ)x(sˆ,γ∗)− t(sˆ,γ∗) = θ (sˆ,γ∗)x(sˆ,γ∗)− t(sˆ,γ∗) = u(sˆ,γ∗). (48)
This shows the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7 (a) Immediate from (12) and (13).
(b) By Lemma 5, it is sufficient to show that ex ante incentive compatibility (8) is equiv-
alent to (37). Indeed, by ex post incentive compatibility we have that U(sˆ) =
∫ 1
0
u(sˆ,γ) dγ.
Hence, ex ante incentive compatibility (8) is equivalent to
U(s)− U(sˆ) ≥
∫ 1
0
max
γˆ
u(sˆ, γˆ; s,γ) dγ−
∫ 1
0
u(sˆ,γ) dγ (49)
=
∫ 1
0
u(sˆ,γ∗)− u(sˆ,γ) dγ (50)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ γ∗
γ
∂ u(sˆ, c)
∂ γ
dc dγ (51)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ γ∗
γ
∂ θ (sˆ, c)
∂ γ
x(sˆ, c) dc dγ, (52)
where the first equality follows from Lemma 6b and the final equality follows from Lemma 5.
Moreover, by Lemma 6a, we have that
Rxa(s, sˆ, x) =
∫ 1
0
[θ (s,γ)− θ (sˆ,γ)]x(sˆ,γ) dγ (53)
=
∫ 1
0
[θ (sˆ,γ∗)− θ (sˆ,γ)]x(sˆ,γ) dγ (54)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ γ∗
γ
∂ θ (sˆ, c)
∂ γ
x(sˆ,γ) dc dγ. (55)
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Adding the last term to Rxp(s, sˆ, x) yields expression (52), and hence, (37) holds.
Moreover, to see that Rxp(s, sˆ, x) is positive, observe that γ ≷ γ∗(s, sˆ,γ)⇔ s ≶ sˆ for all
γ ∈ (0,1) by (3) and Lemma 6a. Hence, since ∂ θ/∂ γ is positive by Lemma 1c, and x(sˆ,γ) is
non–decreasing in γ according to Lemma 5, Rxp is positive.
Finally, suppose that x(sˆ,γ) is not constant in γ on (0,1), and consider the case s > sˆ.
(The case s < sˆ can be treated analogously.) Then, because x(sˆ,γ) is non–decreasing in γ
according to Lemma 5, there exist 0 < γ1 < γ
′
2
< 1 such that x(sˆ,γ1) < x(sˆ,γ
′
2
) and x(sˆ,γ) is
not constant on the open interval (γ1,γ
′
2
). Define
γ2 = inf{γ | x(sˆ,γ) = x(sˆ,γ
′
2
)}. (56)
Because x(sˆ,γ) is not constant on the open interval (γ1,γ
′
2
), we have that γ1 < γ2. Let
∆γ= min
γ∈[γ1,γ2]
γ∗(s, sˆ,γ)− γ. (57)
Note that ∆γ exists and, since s > sˆ and 0< γ1 < γ2 < 1, we have ∆γ > 0.
Now let
γ0 = γ2 − 1/2 ·∆γ. (58)
Then, by definition of γ2, we have for all γ ∈ [γ0,γ2) that γ < γ2 and γ+∆γ > γ2 so that∫ γ+∆γ
γ
{x(sˆ, c)− x(sˆ,γ)} dc > 0. (59)
Therefore, ∫ γ2
γ0
∫ γ+∆γ
γ
{x(sˆ, c)− x(sˆ,γ)} dcdγ > 0. (60)
Moreover, let
k = min
c∈[γ0,γ2]
∂ θ (sˆ, c)
∂ γ
> 0, (61)
which is strictly positive by Lemma 1c.
Applying these properties together with x(sˆ,γ) being non–decreasing in γ, we can infer:
Rxp(s, sˆ, x) =
∫ 1
0
∫ γ∗(s,sˆ,γ)
γ
∂ θ (sˆ, c)
∂ γ
[x(sˆ, c)− x(sˆ,γ)] dc dγ (62)
≥
∫ γ2
γ0
∫ γ∗(s,sˆ,γ)
γ
∂ θ (sˆ, c)
∂ γ
[x(sˆ, c)− x(sˆ,γ)] dc dγ (63)
≥ k
∫ γ2
γ0
∫ γ+∆γ
γ
[x(sˆ, c)− x(sˆ,γ)] dc dγ > 0. (64)
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where the final inequality follows from (60). This shows that Rxp(s, sˆ, x) > 0 if x(sˆ,γ) is not
constant in γ on (0,1) and completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8 (a) Note that γ∗(s, s,γ) = γ. Hence,
lim
δ→0
Rxp(s+δ, s, x)
δ
=
∫ 1
0

lim
δ→0
1
δ
∫ γ∗(s+δ,s,γ)
γ∗(s,s,γ)
∂ θ (s, c)
∂ γ
[x(s, c)− x(s,γ)] dc

 dγ, (65)
because we can interchange integration and taking the limit since all functions are bounded.
Now observe that because the model is continuous, we have that θ (s,γ) is differentiable in s,
and thus Lemma 6a, implies that γ∗(s, sˆ,γ) is differentiable in s. Hence, by Leibniz’ rule, the
term in the square bracket in(65) is equal to
∂ θ (s,γ∗(s+δ, s,γ))
∂ γ
[x(s,γ∗(s+ δ, s,γ))− x(s,γ)] ·
∂ γ∗(s+ δ, s,γ)
∂ s

δ=0
= 0, (66)
because x(s,γ∗(s+δ, s,γ))|δ=0 = x(s,γ
∗(s, s,γ)) = x(s,γ) so that the difference in the squared
brackets in (66) is zero, and this shows part (a).
To see part (b), observe first that U˜ andU are increasing in s since s > sˆ implies Rxa(s, sˆ, x)≥
0 by Lemma 1a, and Lemma 7 then implies U˜(s)− U˜(sˆ) ≥ 0 and U(s)− U(sˆ) ≥ 0. Therefore,
U˜ and U are differentiable almost everywhere. Consider s ∈ S at which U˜ ′ exists. Then, by
Lemma 7a:
lim
δ→0
1/δ · [U˜(s+ δ)− U˜(s)] ≥ lim
δ→0
1/δ · Rxa(s+ δ, s, x) =
∫ 1
0
∂ θ (s,γ)
∂ s
x(s,γ) dγ, (67)
and
lim
δ→0
1/δ · [U˜(s)− U˜(s−δ)] ≤ lim
δ→0
−1/δ · Rxa(s−δ, s, x) =
∫ 1
0
∂ θ (s,γ)
∂ s
x(s,γ) dγ, (68)
where the limits on the right hand side exist, because ∂ θ (s,γ)/∂ s exists and is bounded. The
two inequalities imply that
U˜ ′(s) =
∫ 1
0
∂ θ (s,γ)
∂ s
x(s,γ) dγ. (69)
With analogous reasoning, we can deduce by Lemma 7b that for all s ∈ S at which U ′ exists,
we have
U ′(s) = lim
δ→0
1/δ · Rxa(s+δ, s, x) + lim
δ→0
1/δ · Rxp(s+ δ, s, x) (70)
=
∫ 1
0
∂ θ (s,γ)
∂ s
x(s,γ) dγ+ 0, (71)
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where the final equality follows from part (a). Hence we have shown that U˜ ′(s) = U ′(s) for all
s ∈ S at which the derivatives exist. Moreover, as remarked earlier, U˜ and U are increasing,
thus the derivatives are positive. This completes the proof of part (b). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 Note that (b) directly follows from (a) with x = x∗. Hence, we
only show (a). If x is implementable with privately observable γ, then there exists a transfer
schedule t such that (x , t) is feasible with privately observable γ. Denote by tˆ a solution to
(11), that is, (x , tˆ) is feasible and
W (x) =
∫
S
∫ 1
0
tˆ(s,γ) dγ dP(s). (72)
We now show that if x(s,γ) is not constant in γ on (0,1), then W (x) < W˜ (x), which implies
that x is not implementable without ex post information rents. We prove this result by con-
structing an alternative set of transfers t˜ such that (x , t˜) is feasible with publicly observable
γ and satisfies
W (x)<
∫
S
∫ 1
0
t˜(s,γ) dγ dP(s). (73)
Indeed, define
R≡min
s 6=s
Rxp(s, s, x). (74)
For the discrete model, S is finite and, therefore, the minimum exists. Since x(s,γ) is not
constant in γ on (0,1), Lemma 7b, implies that R > 0. Define now the alternative payment
scheme t˜ by
t˜(s,γ) =
(
tˆ(s,γ) if s = s
tˆ(s,γ) + R otherwise.
(75)
Clearly, t˜ satisfies (73). In order to show that (x , t˜) is also feasible with publicly observable γ,
let U˜(s) be the expected utility of buyer type s from the mechanism (x , t˜) when he truthfully
reports his type s, and γ is publicly observable, as defined after equation (12). Likewise,
let U(s) be the expected utility of buyer type s from the mechanism (x , tˆ) when he truthfully
reports his type s, and γ is privately observable, as defined after equation (7). By construction
of the payments, we have
U˜(s) = U(s)− R ∀s 6= s, U˜(s) = U(s). (76)
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We now show that (x , t˜) is incentive compatible with publicly observable γ. Indeed, since
(x , tˆ) is incentive compatible with private ex post information, Lemma 7b, implies for all
s 6= s, sˆ 6= s,
U˜(s)− U˜(sˆ) = U(s)− U(sˆ)≥ Rxa(s, sˆ, x˜) + Rxp(s, sˆ, x˜)≥ Rxa(s, sˆ, x˜), (77)
and for all s 6= s,
U˜(s)− U˜(s) = U(s)− U(s)− R≥ Rxa(s, s, x˜) + Rxp(s, s, x˜)− R≥ Rxa(s, s, x˜), (78)
and for all sˆ 6= s,
U˜(s)− U˜(sˆ) = U(s)− U(sˆ) + R≥ Rxa(s, sˆ, x˜) + Rxp(s, sˆ, x˜) + R≥ Rxa(s, sˆ, x˜). (79)
Hence, U˜ satisfies the inequalities in Lemma 7a, and thus (x , t˜) is incentive compatible with
public ex post information.
It remains to show that (x , t˜) is individually rational with public ex post information.
Indeed, since (x , tˆ) is individually rational with private ex post information, we have U˜(s) =
U(s)≥ 0. Since we established in the proof of Lemma 8b that U˜(s) is increasing in s whenever
the mechanism is incentive compatible with publicly observable γ, we have U˜(s) ≥ U˜(s) ≥ 0
for all s ∈ S so that (x , t˜) is individually rational. And this completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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